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The Effect of Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Firm Performance 
 
 
Abstract 
The recent increase in the use of deferred and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs) by 
government agencies as a mechanism to hold a firm accountable for having engaged in 
wrongdoing and to reform the firm’s practices has given rise to a vigorous debate regarding the 
merits and drawbacks of such arrangements, compared with the alternative of prosecuting these 
firms. We find that firms subject to DPAs experience significantly lower buy-and-hold returns in 
the one- to three-year period following the DPA compared with prosecuted firms. These results 
are consistent with shareholders experiencing a wealth loss when a firm enters into a DPA. We 
also show that DPA firms experience negative real consequences following the initiation of a DPA, 
relative to prosecuted firms, as measured by decreases in both sales and the number of employees. 
These results are inconsistent with the idea that DPAs reduce the collateral damage to stakeholders 
who are not responsible for the crimes committed by the organization (i.e., innocent parties). 
 
Keywords: Non-prosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, prosecution, 
litigation, financial performance.  
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The Effect of Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Firm Performance 
 
1.  Introduction 
Government agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Labor (DOL), have traditionally either 
prosecuted firms for criminal misconduct or settled wrongdoing through plea deals. More recently, 
the use of a third option—deferred and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs, hereafter)—has 
become increasingly popular. With the agreement of the firm alleged to be involved in 
wrongdoing, DPAs allow government agencies to impose a customized set of conditions, often 
including changes to governance and compliance, as well as financial penalties, on the firm. In 
return, the government agrees to defer or decline prosecuting the firm in the future. Since 2000, 
government agencies have entered into over 300 agreements with various corporations, of which 
more than half have been executed in 2010 or later (Dunn et al., 2014). Neither the factors that 
have led to an increase in the use of the DPAs, nor the choices of the conditions and compliance 
stipulated in the agreements, are clear. While anecdotal evidence suggests that the cost of litigation 
and the fear of unintended consequences has been the driving force behind the proliferation of this 
alternative mechanism to prosecution, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first empirical study 
to examine the impact of DPAs on longer-term firm performance.  
Although the use of DPAs has increased significantly in the past decade, the practice has 
not been without controversy (Kaal and Lacine, 2014). Proponents of their increased use argue 
that the agreements are a more efficient method to discipline firms for failing to comply with laws. 
Given the bargaining power residing with the government in a DPA, corporate changes can be 
enacted without: 1) the government incurring costs associated with litigation while obtaining the 
burden of proof to secure criminal conviction; and, 2) creating unintended collateral damage to the 
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economy and other stakeholders, similar to those resulting from the indictment of Arthur 
Andersen.  
Those opposing the use of DPAs, however, point out that these agreements are extrajudicial 
contracts that operate outside of the regular legal system and potentially undermine the rule of law. 
Further, the extent of bargaining power available to the government agencies allows them to 
potentially impose overly strict conditions, which may be more costly to firms’ stakeholders than 
any collateral damage arising from prosecution (Greenblum, 2005).  Additionally, opponents raise 
the issue that such agreements may be ineffective due both to the variation in their implementation 
and difficulty in assessing the extent to which firms comply with each condition set forth in such 
agreements. In essence, DPAs are viewed by critics as a more lenient way to deal with corporate 
crime that may be more detrimental to shareholders and other stakeholders than litigation. 
Ultimately, it is an open question as to whether DPAs are a more or a less effective method 
compared with the alternative of prosecution. Corporate governance and conduct improvements 
associated with DPAs are mostly internal to the firm and difficult to measure directly. Accordingly, 
we examine firms’ longer-term stock market performance to capture the relative net benefit of 
being subjected to a DPA as opposed to prosecution. 
We gather a sample of 109 DPA firms for which all financial variables are available from 
the privately gathered collection of DPAs, generously made available by Professor Brandon 
Garrett of Duke University. We compare our sample of DPA firms to 496 firms prosecuted by the 
government. In our main set of tests, we find that DPA firms experience significantly lower stock 
market performance relative to the prosecuted firms. By the end of the first year following the 
DPA, we find that buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are 15.5 percentage points lower for 
DPA firms relative to prosecuted firms. By the end of the third year, BHAR is 21.4 percentage 
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points lower for DPA firms relative to prosecuted firms. Our finding is robust to various measures 
of stock market performance.  
To further explore whether DPAs potentially shield other stakeholders from collateral 
damages, we examine the effect these agreements have on the change in sales levels, the number 
of employees, and total assets relative to firms that are prosecuted. If the agreements are enacted 
to shield other stakeholders from the potential fallout that comes with the litigation, we would 
expect to see the benefits accruing to such stakeholders. Interestingly, we do not observe the 
collateral benefits of such arrangements. Specifically, we find that DPA firms have lower sales 
and fewer employees following a DPA. By the end of the third year, we find that the change in 
sales levels is 11.2 percentage points lower for DPA firms relative to prosecuted firms. The change 
in employee levels for DPA firms show a similar trend with a decline of 11.0 percentage points by 
the end of the third year relative to prosecuted firms. Overall, our results do not lend support for 
the idea that DPAs are more beneficial to a firm’s stakeholders.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the study is one of the earliest 
to explore the implications of deferred and non-prosecution agreements for investors and other 
stakeholders, such as employees and governments, both in the U.S and abroad.1 While legal 
scholars have examined the nature of the prosecution agreements descriptively, there are no 
studies, to our knowledge, that empirically examine whether such agreements are beneficial to the 
 
1 A recent high-profile scandal involving SNC-Lavalin, a Canadian firm accused of paying millions of dollars in bribes 
to conduct business abroad, is one example of the controversy surrounding DPAs outside of the U.S. The firm is 
alleged to have issued a “threat” to the Canadian government that it would be forced to eliminate a significant portion 
of its workforce should it be prosecuted, effectively lobbying the government to grant it leniency through a DPA. 
According to allegations, SNC-Lavalin argued that the DPA would allow it to remediate its procedural deficiencies 
while saving the jobs of thousands of Canadians. The government defended its position to eventually deal with the 
SNC-Lavalin corruption case through a DPA rather than through a more traditional court process stating that such an 
agreement is not a “get-out-of-jail-free-card” and any firm involved in such an agreement is subject to significant fines 
and sanctions.1 Despite reassurances by the government that SNC-Lavalin’s wrongdoing was being appropriately 
punished, many disagreed with the idea that such agreements are equivalent to the regular judicial process and 
characterized the government’s use of such an agreement as an attempt to sweep the scandal under the rug. 
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firm and other stakeholder groups or whether, alternatively, they lead to worse outcomes relative 
to litigation.2 To that end, we document that DPAs seem to result in the worsening of corporate 
performance compared with prosecution. Furthermore, contrary to popular belief, we document 
that such arrangements do not appear to provide the benefit of protecting employees and other 
constituencies from collateral damages imposed by prosecution. This result has important policy 
implications, as it adds to the debate on whether there are tangible benefits or costs to these 
extrajudicial agreements, and whether the increased use of DPAs as witnessed during the past 
decade is warranted. Second, the study contributes to the literature examining the impact of 
litigation on corporate reform. The findings in our study add further credence to the idea that 
litigation acts as a corporate governance mechanism benefiting shareholders (Appel, 2016) and 
may be superior to other arrangements (e.g., DPAs) that plaintiffs may explore to “punish” the 
firm for corporate misconduct. Third, our study contributes to our understanding of corporate 
governance by exploring an alternative channel through which changes to corporate conduct can 
be induced and documenting the effectiveness of such a channel in reforming corporate behavior 
and, ultimately, improving firm performance.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background and provides greater insight into the nature of DPAs. Section 3 reviews related 
literature while Section 4 develops our hypotheses. Section 5 describes the data used and the 
research design. Section 6 discusses our findings. Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Institutional Background 
Traditionally, a firm found to have engaged in unlawful behavior was subject to 
 
2 One related working paper that we are aware of is Kaal and Lacine (2015). They study the short-term stock market 
response to DPAs and observe mixed results. The working paper, however, is incomplete and lacks statistical tests.   
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government prosecution. The outcome of such prosecution may have resulted in a lengthy legal 
trial or a settlement through a plea deal. Prosecution can have serious consequences for the accused 
firm, however, as witnessed by the Enron scandal and subsequent prosecution of Arthur Andersen, 
leading to the collapse of the accounting firm and eventual layoff of 28,000 of its employees 
(Garrett, 2014). To avoid this costly process and mitigate similar possible unintended 
consequences of prosecution to various stakeholders, government agencies in the United States, 
U.K., and, more recently, Canada, have begun entering into non-prosecution or deferred 
prosecution agreements (DPAs, hereafter) instead of prosecuting firms accused of wrongdoing.3   
In the U.S., DPAs have been in the existence since the early 1990s. Such agreements, 
however, were infrequently used until 1999, when the Department of Justice implemented 
guidelines regarding the prosecution of business organizations. The original guidelines, drafted by 
the then Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr., stipulated nine factors to be considered when deciding 
which course of action to pursue when dealing with corporate crimes.4 While the guidelines make 
no specific mention of DPAs as a possible mechanism for dealing with corporate offenders, they 
provide criteria as to when some type of “alternative” to prosecution may be considered. Among 
the nine factors specified, accused firm’s cooperation with the investigation is often considered 
the most important deciding factor as to whether a government agency should pursue an alternative 
to prosecution. Other notable factors include the adequacy of the offender’s compliance system, 
prior history of wrongdoing, self-reporting of the underlying issue, proactive undertaking of 
remedial actions, waiver of client-attorney privileges, and the likelihood of collateral consequences 
 
3 While we use the DPA abbreviation through the study, our intent is to capture both types of agreements: the non-
prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements.  
4 The original guidelines are often referred to as the Holder Memo, because they were created by the then Attorney 
General, Eric Holder Jr. History available in “The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations: A 
Ten-Year Anniversary Perspective”, which can be found at https://www.paulweiss.com/media/1497187 
/pw_nysba_oct09.pdf.  
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to the stakeholders.5  
Despite the availability of this alternative mechanism to deal with corporate crime since 
the 1990s, the use of the agreements increased significantly only in the most recent years. Between 
1993 and 2005, there were only 34 DPAs negotiated between various government agencies and 
firms accused of wrongdoing (Barkow and Barkow, 2011). Most of the agreements occur after 
Attorney General Larry Thompson revised the Holder Memo and issued it in a form of new 
guidance entitled “The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” in 2003. The 
updated guidelines, which explicitly named deferred prosecution as one of the options to punish 
and reform corporations following wrongdoing, were issued as a response to the criticism of the 
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) handling of the Arthur Andersen prosecution (Uhlmann, 2013), 
leading to the ultimate collapse of the firm. 
Issuance of the new guidelines and two subsequent revisions—one in 2006 and another in 
2008—resulted in a significant spike in the use of the agreements as an alternative disciplining 
mechanism used by government agencies dealing with corporate crime. Since 2000, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have entered 
into over 300 agreements with various corporations, of which more than half have been executed 
in 2010 or later (Dunn et al., 2014). While many DPAs have been initiated by the DOJ or the SEC, 
these are not the only two agencies using similar types of agreements in place of prosecution. The 
agreements are normally formed between a firm accused of misconduct and the regulatory agency 
that has a jurisdiction over the matter in which the firm is alleged to have behaved unlawfully.  
While the U.S. has a relatively longer history of DPA use, other countries have recently 
adopted similar practices. For instance, Canada introduced similar agreements as recently as in 
 
5 Original memo available at the U.S. Department of Justice website: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
criminal-fraud /legacy /2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF.  
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2018 by means of a modification to the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code defines such 
remediation agreements as “an agreement between an organization accused of having committed 
an offence and a prosecutor, to stay any proceedings related to that offence if the organization 
complies with the terms of the agreement.”6 While multiple countries presently use DPAs, the 
implementation of the DPA mechanism differs across different jurisdictions in certain aspects. For 
example, unlike in the U.S. where the role of the courts is limited, Canadian implementation of 
DPAs stipulates that a superior court must first judicially approve any such agreement before it is 
considered valid.7  
Regardless of the jurisdiction, DPAs are similar along many dimensions. Such agreements 
usually impose a monetary penalty on the accused firm. In addition, they customarily stipulate a 
number of conditions, which the accused firm must meet in order to avoid further legal action 
(hence, the term “deferred prosecution”). Compliance with the conditions is monitored over the 
length of the agreement either directly by the government agency involved, or by appointing an 
independent third party (i.e., an external monitor) to oversee the compliance process. While 
traditional prosecution is considered the proverbial “stick” of the legal system, the DPA is the 
“carrot.” In return for some combination of cooperation, payment of fines, and admission of guilt, 
the government agency spares the firms from a lengthy trial, possible criminal conviction, and the 
associated reputational damage that can ensue following prosecution.8  
3.   Literature Review 
The rapid rise in the use of DPAs as an alternative to prosecution leads to a natural question 
 
6 Full text of criminal code available at: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-46.pdf. 
7 “Deferred Prosecution Agreements are Coming to Canada” — https://blg.com/en/News-And-Publications/ 
Publication_5406.  
8 “Government of Canada Announces Public Consultation regarding Deferred Prosecution Agreements” found at 
https://mcmillan.ca/government-of-canada-announces-public-consultation-regarding-deferred-prosecution-
agreements-dpas.  
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of whether such agreements are effective at enacting corporate governance changes and 
subsequently leading to improvement in performance of firms entering into such agreements. 
Popular opinion regarding the effectiveness of such arrangements vis-à-vis prosecution, the 
alternative disciplining mechanism, varies greatly with pundits on both sides proposing compelling 
arguments as to why DPAs may or may not lead to the desired improvement in corporate conduct 
and, ultimately, firm performance.  
While little evidence exists on the costs and benefits of DPAs, a significant literature 
studies the effects of prosecution (i.e., government prosecution and private litigation) on firms as 
well as the individual actors accused of corporate misconduct. In order to hypothesize about the 
relative strength of the two disciplining mechanisms in improving firm performance, one has to 
understand possible differences between the two as well as prior findings regarding the impact of 
prosecution on firm outcomes.  
Prior literature posits that prosecution can act as either an ex-ante or an ex-post governance 
mechanism. Thompson (1999) argues that through the threat of litigation, shareholders and other 
stakeholders can ex-ante affect firm’s corporate governance and, ultimately, its conduct. Further, 
Appel (2016) posits that the mere threat of securities litigation can deter firms from engaging in 
wrongdoing in the first place. Personal reputation costs borne by directors and officers associated 
with litigated firms motivates such individuals to not engage in behaviors that may lead to litigation 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Karpoff et al., 2008; Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014). Using state-level 
staggered adoption of universal demand laws, which make litigation significantly more difficult, 
Appel (2016) finds that reducing the threat of litigation leads to worse financial performance and 
increased entrenchment at firms affected by the passage of such laws. Similarly, Donelson and 
Yust (2014) document that an exogenous decrease in litigation risk adversely affects operating 
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performance and leads to an increase in restatements. In essence, easy access to litigation as a 
potential disciplining mechanism leads firms, ex ante, to behave in a way that is beneficial to 
shareholders. While litigation is often studied empirically in the context of securities class action 
lawsuits, government agencies can also bring lawsuits against corporations and, presumably, also 
affect corporate governance through similar channels. 
Conditional on having engaged in wrongdoing, prosecution can also help restore firms’ 
corporate governance ex-post. Litigation settlements often specify changes to governance practices 
that firms should implement (Appel, 2016). Erickson (2010) estimates that around 80% of 
litigation judgments include provisions specifically aimed at improving corporate governance. 
Ferris et al. (2007) and Cheng et al. (2010) document that litigated firms experience a significant 
increase in the number of outsiders on their boards along with other positive changes to their board 
characteristics. Even without specific requirements to change governance, firms often make 
changes to the board and the executive team following a high-profile negative event to signal a 
commitment to improved behavior as well as improve their legitimacy (Liu, 2013). As 
improvements to governance are virtually certain post-litigation, it is plausible that litigation will 
ultimately result in improved future performance because good governance leads to better financial 
performance. Certainly, numerous studies show that governance structure affects firm 
performance. For instance, increased board independence (Weisbach, 1988, Yeh and Woidtke, 
2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Choi et al., 2007; Black and Kim, 2012), board expertise 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Goh, 2009), and removal of entrenchment provisions (Bebchuk 
and Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007) are shown to improve firm performance along different 
dimensions and lead to an increase in firm value. 
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4. Hypothesis Development 
Based on the discussion above, the question arises as to how DPAs compare to prosecution 
in their perceived ability to ex-post improve firm governance and ultimately performance. On one 
hand, it is possible that DPAs can be as effective, if not more, in achieving the desired outcomes 
following prosecution. By virtue of government agencies’ bargaining power, corporate changes 
can be forced upon a target firm.9 Should the firm not comply with the terms of the enacted 
agreement, the government agency in question may elect to pursue further action and eventually 
prosecute the firm. As firms are unlikely to risk an indictment, prosecutors can expect compliance 
with every demand (Markoff, 2013). In the case of those agreements that defer prosecution, given 
that the threat of litigation is not removed but rather merely delayed for a period of time conditional 
on firms meeting the demands set forth, these agreements have the potential to more readily bring 
about change than traditional prosecution.  
Further, prosecution is costly, not only to the government, but also to the accused firm. The 
legal fees can be considerable, and even if the financial settlement or judgement is relatively low, 
the financial benefits may accrue primarily to the lawyers, rather than to the firm’s shareholders 
(Romano, 1991). By entering into a DPA, the firm avoids prolonged litigation, which can consume 
financial and other resources (Coffee, 1986; Romano, 1991; Lowry and Shu, 2002; Haslem, 2005; 
Simmons and Ryan, 2007), and have negative consequences in terms of reputation (Karpoff and 
Lott, 1999; Atanasov et al., 2007; Franz et al., 2015), access to capital (Autore et al., 2014) and 
firm value (Cutler and Summers, 1988; Bizjak and Coles, 1995). In some instances, the cost of 
prosecution may be so large that it leads to significant financial distress and increased likelihood 
of bankruptcy (Bhagat et al., 1994). Lawsuits brought forward by government agencies, in 
 
9 Assistant Attorney General, Lanny A. Breuer, U.S. Department of Justice at an address to the New York City Bar 
Association. Available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2 012/crm-speech-1209131.html. 
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particular, are associated with some of the largest wealth losses (Bhagat et al., 1998). By avoiding 
government-initiated prosecution, firms also avoid the potential large negative payoff associated 
with such an event. Consequently, it is possible that DPAs lead to better firm performance in the 
period following the unlawful event compared with prosecution due to the lower costs incurred 
when disciplined through a DPA.  
On the other hand, opponents consider a DPA to be a weaker form of disciplining—the 
legal equivalent of a “slap on the wrist.” They claim that by entering into an agreement, the 
government agencies, in essence, allow for preferential treatment of some firms, indicating the 
government’s lack of appetite to discipline such firms, and sowing doubt regarding the 
government’s commitment to deal with corporate crime (Uhlmann, 2013; Markoff, 2013). For 
example, following the U.S. DOJ’s deferred prosecution agreement with HSBC for money 
laundering and violation of sanctions, the New York Times ran an editorial claiming that it was a 
“dark day for the rule of law” and noted that government has “bought into the notion that too big 
to fail is too big to jail.” (See Markoff (2013) for the full reference to the case.) 
Knowing that the government is willing to cut a deal, such firms may be reluctant to fully 
implement the required changes. Variation in the conditions stipulated in the agreements as well 
as variation in the enforcement and monitoring of the compliance with such conditions may render 
such agreements ineffective. In essence, those opposed to these arrangements posit that such deals 
undermine the rule of law as they exist outside the realm of the regular legal system (Uhlmann, 
2013). If DPAs are ineffective at enacting meaningful improvements to corporate governance and 
corporate conduct, there is little reason to believe that firms subject to such agreements would 
experience better future firm performance.  
Even if the DPAs are not a weaker form of disciplining, from the firm’s perspective, it is 
13 
 
possible that DPAs are as costly, if not more costly, than prosecution. As the government agency 
has greater bargaining power, for DPA firms the punishment enacted through fines may be greater 
in magnitude and compliance requirements placed on to the firms more burdensome and costly to 
implement relative to those determined by litigation. Further, compliance with the agreements 
mandate certain corporate changes and on-going compliance with the conditions set forth in the 
agreement. The process of complying with the conditions may be more than just financially costly; 
it could be time-consuming as well, draining corporate resources throughout the duration of the 
agreement.  
In light of these competing views, we argue that it is ultimately an empirical question as to 
whether the impact of DPAs is comparable to that of prosecution. We examine the impact of DPAs 
on firm performance for the following two reasons. First, while DPAs are meant to lead to 
corporate reform through changes in corporate governance, any changes in corporate conduct are 
internal to the firm and, therefore, difficult to observe and measure directly. In fact, the 
Government Accountability Office issued a report on the use of DPAs and noted the following:10 
"DOJ cannot evaluate and demonstrate the extent to which DPAs and NPAs—in 
addition to other tools, such as prosecution—contribute to the department's efforts 
to combat corporate crime because it has no measures to assess their effectiveness. 
Specifically, DOJ intends for these agreements to promote corporate reform; 
however, DOJ does not have performance measures in place to assess whether this 
goal has been met."  
Second, even if we could observe and measure changes to conduct, we would not be able to capture 
the costs associated with these changes by simply examining whether a firm implements them or 
not. By associating firm performance with the choice of the disciplining mechanism, we are better 
 
10 DOJ Has Taken Steps to Better Track its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, but Should Evaluate 
Effectiveness, US Government Accountability Office, December 2009. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d10110.pdf.  
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able to capture the relative net impact of the mechanism on firm value. If reforms resulting from 
the agreements are net beneficial, any benefits derived should be reflected in the firm performance 
in subsequent periods. Hence, we examine firms’ longer-term stock market performance to capture 
the relative net benefit of being subjected to a DPA as opposed to prosecution. Accordingly, our 
first hypothesis (in null form) is stated as follows: 
H1: A firm disciplined through a DPA for an unlawful event experiences post-event 
firm stock market performance similar to that of a firm subjected to prosecution.  
One of the main arguments put forth by government agencies justifying the alternative use 
of DPAs as disciplining mechanisms is that they shield the firm and ultimately its stakeholders, 
namely employees, from the unintended consequences of prosecution. Prosecuted firms may incur 
significant reputational damage, such as the potential loss of clients, customers, and contracts, 
which consequently leads the firm to shutting down or downsizing. Such outcomes may eliminate 
jobs and negatively impact the local economy. Further, prior studies document that the negative 
wealth effects associated with prosecution are not limited to the defendant; instead, negative 
consequences can spill over to industry peers as well (Gande and Lewis, 2009). The sentiment is 
echoed in the guidelines, issued by Attorney General Thompson and further revised in 2008, which 
state: “Obtaining a conviction may produce a result that seriously harms innocent third parties who 
played no role in the criminal conduct.” Anecdotally, the litigation of Arthur Andersen led to the 
corporate collapse and loss of 28,000 jobs across the country. To the extent that DPAs can prevent 
collateral damage to the employees and other stakeholders resulting from downsizing or shutting 
down business segments, there may be value to such arrangements even if firm performance does 
not differ based on the choice of the disciplining mechanism.  
While those in favor of DPAs point to Arthur Andersen as an example of litigation that led 
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to a massive economic impact, it is important to note that the Andersen case was unusual in that 
respect. Most firms involved in high-profile prosecutions resulting from corporate wrongdoing are 
still in business (Markoff, 2013). Furthermore, the alternative to prosecution is not costless to the 
firm either. A firm entering into a DPA has to pay a fine and invest significant resources into 
complying with the conditions of the agreement. The financial and management time burden 
associated with the enactment of the DPA may be severe enough to lead to the streamlining of 
operations or implementation of cost-cutting measures, ultimately having a negative impact on the 
firm’s ability to keep the operations intact and leading to similar downsizing and negative 
consequences to stakeholders. Further, it is not clear that firms entering into DPAs are fully 
shielded from the reputational damage that comes from being identified as a corporate offender. 
As many of the DPAs are highly publicized, even though the content of the DPA is often not 
disclosed, it is generally known that a firm breached the law. The fact that the firm was allowed to 
enter a DPA instead of being prosecuted may not lead to a more positive perception of the firm, or 
limit the reputational damage stemming from being associated with illegal activity.  Therefore, it 
is not clear, ex ante, whether a DPA can shield a firm’s stakeholders from the negative 
consequences of the firm’s involvement in wrongdoing and subsequently, limit the collateral 
damage. Accordingly, our second hypothesis (in null form) is stated as follows: 
H2: A firm disciplined through a DPA for an unlawful event experiences post-event 
collateral damages (e.g., downsizing, employee loss) similar to that of a firm 
subjected to prosecution.   
5.  Data and Research Design  
5.1.  Data and Sample Construction 
We begin by creating a list of all companies that enter into a DPA. To do so, we use the 
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privately gathered collection of DPAs and docket sheets generously made available by Professor 
Brandon Garrett of Duke University. As there is no public repository of DPAs, he compiled the 
initial set of companies through FOIA requests (Garrett, 2014). We compare this set of firms with 
data from the International Association of Independent Corporate Monitors (IAICM) to ensure that 
we have as complete a set of agreements as possible. Using the two repositories as the starting 
point yields a total of 467 firms for which such agreements are available. We perform secondary 
searches using Google and the Bloomberg Business Week website to identify the parent company 
at the time of the agreement and hand match the parent company name to CRSP. This initial 
screening results in 184 DPAs between the years 2001 and 2017. We require that all observations 
have a full set of dependent variables and control variables, restricting the final DPA sample to 
109 unique agreements, as shown in Table 1. One limitation of our study is that we cannot observe 
what performance of DPA firms would have looked like had these firms been prosecuted. To the 
extent that DPA firms are particularly vulnerable to collateral damages arising from prosecution, 
we may not be able to fully capture the extent to which these firms benefit from DPAs relative to 
prosecution. That said, to partially address the limitation, we use a matched control sample of firms 
that do not enter into a DPA where the control firms are matched on industry, year, and closest 
size in the year prior to the date of the DPA. 
To construct our sample of prosecuted firms, we start with litigation data from Audit 
Analytics, which contains various types of litigation. Since we are interested in litigation in which 
the plaintiff is a government organization (as opposed to shareholder litigation), we retain 
observations in the litigation sample only if one of the plaintiffs identified is a government agency. 
We impose the same data requirements for prosecutions as we do for DPAs, resulting in a final 
sample of 496 unique government prosecutions. As with the DPA sample, we identify a set of 
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control firms that are not prosecuted by the government, matching on industry and closest size in 
the year prior to initiation of the prosecution. 
Table 2 provides descriptive information our DPA sample. Panel A shows the sample 
composition by industry, which is defined as the two-digit SIC code. Manufacturing is the most 
highly represented industry in our sample with 49 observations, followed by finance with 28 
observations.  
The remaining panels provide additional hand collected terms of the DPA agreements. 
Panel B lists the frequency of the primary offense category. “FCPA/Bribery/Kickbacks” is the 
most common primary offense with 46 observations, followed closely by “Fraud” with 44 
observations. Other offenses include antitrust, environmental, food and drug, and labor violations. 
In lieu of prosecution, companies are commonly forced to allocate additional resources to 
compliance controls, often under the oversight of an independent monitor. When selecting an 
independent monitor, the government, company, or both parties suggest a list of potential 
candidates. According to John Hanson of the International Association of Independent Corporate 
Monitors:  
“The best person for this role is an expert on corporate compliance and ethics 
programs. That can involve a lawyer or not, someone who has previously worked 
for the federal government or not. The trick is to find someone who can effectuate 
a plan that he or she had no input on developing.” 
Panel C shows that in our sample, an independent monitor is appointed in 34% (37/109) of the 
cases.11 The panel also documents that of the agreements, 88 of the 109 agreements refer to specific 
 
11 While about a third of DPAs require that the firm use an independent monitor to devise the plan to improve processes 
and procedures and provide oversight over the implementation, the role of a monitor has not been without controversy. 
In some instances, monitors have been crucial in ensuring a firm’s remediation of problems (e.g., Standard Chartered 
Bank’s monitor was instrumental in finding loopholes in company’s software). Equally, however, there are 
documented cases of corporate monitors acting in a way that violated purported independence. Adding to the 
complexity, corporate monitors are paid by the company which they are in charge of overseeing, casting some doubt 
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pre-agreement compliance actions taken by the offending firm. Examples of pre-agreement 
compliance include extraordinary cooperation by the company, voluntary disclosure of criminal 
activities, remedial actions taken to improve compliance procedures, the addition of board 
members, and the removal of individuals directly involved in the criminal activities. The last 
column of Panel C shows that 86 DPAs require a compliance program, which typically involve 
periodic reporting on compliance improvements taken by the offending firm.  
From Panel D, we observe that the mean (median) probationary period of our sample is 3.6 
(3.0) years. The mean (median) total monetary fine imposed in our sample is $96.2 million ($13.4 
million). The fine imposed ranges from a minimum of $0 to a maximum $1.7 billion. 
Table 3 provides characteristics of the DPA, prosecuted, and two separate matched control 
samples. All variables are measured in the fiscal year prior to the event year, where the event year 
is defined as the fiscal year that contains the date of the DPA or the initiation of the government 
litigation. The Appendix provides definitions for all variables used in our tests. 
As shown in column (iv), DPA firms and their matched control firms are similar across 
multiple dimensions. However, we do find that DPA firms exhibit lower sales growth (Sales 
Growth) and capital intensiveness (PPE) than control firms at the 10% significance level. We find 
that the prosecuted firms have lower market-to-book ratios (MB), capital intensiveness (PPE), 
sales growth (Sales Growth), returns (Return), and equity issuance (Equity Issue) than their 
matched control firms. However, prosecuted firms have higher analyst following (Coverage) on 
average than control firms. Column (ix) compares DPA firms with prosecuted firms. We find that 
DPA firms are larger at the 1% level, consistent with Garrett’s (2014) premise that larger firms are 
 
on the notion that monitors can remain independent during the oversight process (Thomson Reuters, “Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements: Working with the Independent Monitor”, available at: https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/ 
answerson/deferred-prosecution-agreements-working-independent-monitor/). 
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more likely to receive a DPA than face prosecution. We also find that DPA firms have lower 
market-to-book ratios, are less capital intensive, have lower sales growth than prosecuted firms. 
Other differences are statistically insignificant.  
5.2.   Research Design 
5.2.1. Stock Market Performance. We test the prediction that DPAs differentially affect 
stock market performance (H1) by estimating the following regression: 
BHARt+n = β0 + β1 DPAt + β2 Sizet-1 + β3 MBt-1 + β4 PPEt-1 + β5 Sales Growtht-1  
+ β6 ROAt-1 + β7 Return Stdt-1 + β8 Equity Issuet-1 
+ β9 Going Concernt-1 + β10 Coveraget-1 + Year FE + εt+n (1)
 
BHARt+n is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return measured from the beginning of 
fiscal year t (i.e., the event year) through the end of year t+n. DPA is an indicator variable set to 1 
if the firm entered into a non-prosecution of deferred prosecution agreement in year t, zero 
otherwise. We include a vector of control variables measured in the year prior to the event. Our 
controls include variables which could be correlated with assignment to our treatment or control 
group. Drawing on prior research by Kim and Skinner (2012), we control for the following firm 
characteristics associated with the propensity to face litigation: 1) lagged size (Size), 2) lagged 
market-to-book (MB), 3) lagged capital intensity (PPE), 4) lagged change in sales (Sales Growth), 
5) lagged market performance (Return), and 6) lagged return volatility (Return Std). We also 
control for the demand of capital (Equity Issue and Going Concern) and monitoring of the firm 
(Coverage). Finally, we include year fixed effects in all of our empirical analyses to control for 
variation in our outcome variables over time and to control for time variation in the annual 
operating budgets of government prosecutors. Our coefficient of interest in Eq. (1) is β1, which 
captures the incremental difference in market performance of DPA firms relative to the 
benchmarked sample of ﬁrms (i.e., matched control firms or prosecuted firms). A positive 
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(negative) β1 would be consistent with DPA firms having higher (lower) market performance after 
receiving an DPA relative to benchmark firms.  
4.2.2. Real Effects. In our second set of tests, we test the prediction that DPAs differentially 
affect real outcomes relative to a benchmarked sample (H2). To test for differences in real 
outcomes, we estimate the following regression: 
Real Effectt+n = β0 + β1 DPAt + β2 Sizet-1 + β3 MBt-1 + β4 PPEt-1 + β5 Sales Growtht-1  
+ β6 ROAt-1 + β7 Return Stdt-1 + β8 Equity Issuet-1 
+ β9 Going Concernt-1 + β10 Coveraget-1 + Year FE + εt+n (2)
 
We use several proxies for real effects: 1) the percentage change in annual sales levels from year 
t–1 to year t+n (ΔSales+n), 2) the percentage change in employees from the end of year t–1 to the 
end of year t+n (ΔEmp+n), and 3) the percentage change in total assets from the end of year t–1 to 
the end of year t+n (ΔTA+n). Other variables are as previously described. Our coefficient of interest 
in Eq. (2) is β1, which captures the incremental difference in real effects for DPA firms relative to 
the benchmark ﬁrms.  
6.  Results 
6.1.   Tests of H1: Stock Market Performance  
Table 4 presents results of our univariate tests of stock market performance for DPAs and 
prosecuted firms. As shown in column (i), BHAR is negative and statistically different from zero 
as of the end of the first, second, and third years following a DPA. We do not see a similar decline 
in stock market performance for prosecuted firms, as shown in column (ii). In column (iii), we find 
that BHAR is significantly lower for DPA firms relative to prosecuted firms as of the end of the 
first, second, and third years following the event. We plot BHAR for DPA firms and prosecuted 
firms in Figure 1, which graphically demonstrates the results from Table 4. In year t (i.e., the year 
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of either the DPA or prosecution), we note little difference in BHAR between DPA and prosecuted 
firms. However, for DPA firms, BHAR continues to drift lower relative to prosecuted firms over 
the next three years following the year the agreement was entered into.  
The results of our stock market performance tests are reported in Table 5. In models (i) 
through (iv), we examine the difference in BHAR for DPA firms relative to a matched control 
sample, where BHAR is measured cumulatively over years t through t+3, respectively. In model 
(ii), β1 is negative and marginally significant at the 10% level. In models (iii) and (iv), β1 is 
consistently negative, but no longer significant at conventional levels. In models (v) through (viii), 
we examine the relative difference in BHAR for prosecuted firms relative to a matched control 
sample. DPA is replaced by Prosecuted, an indicator variable set to 1 for prosecuted firms, zero 
otherwise. We find no statistical difference in BHAR between prosecuted firms and a matched 
sample of firms either in the event year or cumulated over the next three years.  
Finally, in models (ix) through (xii), we benchmark DPA firms to prosecuted firms, given 
the important policy implications and debate within legal circles regarding the relative efficacy of 
DPAs relative to the more traditional method of prosecuting corporate crime. In model (ix), we 
find no difference in BHAR between DPA firms and prosecuted firms (β1 = 0.031, p = 0.355). In 
model (x), we find that BHAR is 15.5 percentage points lower for DPA firms relative to prosecuted 
firms (β1 = -0.155, p < 0.01) by the end of the first year following the event. By the end of the 
second and third years, BHAR is 20.5 percentage points (β1 = -0.205, p < 0.01) and 21.4 percentage 
points (β1 = -0.214, p = 0.019) lower, respectively, for DPA firms relative to prosecuted firms. In 
untabulated tests, we reestimate models (ix) through (xii), using the same sample of DPA and 
prosecution firms but use entropy balancing to ensure that our DPA firms and prosecuted firms 
are similar across all control variables measured prior to the event year.  Results and inferences 
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are qualitatively similar.12 
In general, the results from Table 4 and Table 5 provide strong evidence that buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns are significantly lower, both economically and statistically, for DPA firms 
relative to prosecuted firms in the years following the event. These results cast doubt on the notion 
that DPAs are more beneficial to a firm’s shareholders than traditional prosecution.  
6.2.   Tests of H2: Real Effects  
In Section 4, we posit that DPAs impact firms’ operations differentially relative to 
prosecution. We further examine this claim, which forms the basis for the arguments put forth by 
proponents, namely that DPAs may prevent collateral damages to employees and other 
stakeholders. We begin by examining the effect on changes in sales levels, shown in Table 6. 
Models (i) through (iv) examine the difference in ΔSales for DPA firms relative to a matched 
control sample. β1 is negative and marginally significant at the 10% level in year t (β1 = -0.059, p 
= 0.067). In models (ii), (iii), and (iv), β1 is increasingly negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels. By the end of the third year following the DPA, the change in sales levels is 
23.7 percentage points lower for DPA firms relative control firms (β1 = -0.237, p < 0.01). In models 
(v) through (viii), we find no statistically significant difference in ΔSales for prosecuted firms 
relative to a matched set of controls firms. In models (ix) through (xii), DPA firms are 
benchmarked against prosecuted firms. Sales levels decline throughout the three years following 
the DPA. By the end of the third year, we find that the change in sales levels for DPA firms is 11.2 
percentage points lower compared with prosecuted firms (β1 = -0.112, p = 0.034).  
Table 7 reports tests examining the effect of DPAs on changes in employee levels (ΔEmp). 
 
12 All results and inferences for the tests in the remaining analyses in which we compare DPA firms with prosecution 
firms are insensitive to the use of entropy balancing. 
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As in Table 6, models (i) through (iv) benchmark DPA firms to a matched control sample. Our 
coefficient of interest, β1, is negative in models (iii) and (iv), consistent with employee levels 
declining for DPA firms. By contrast, we find no statistically significant difference between 
prosecuted firms and matched control firms. Finally, in models (ix) through (xii), DPA firms are 
benchmarked against prosecuted firms. By the end of the second and third years, the change in 
employee levels is 6.4 percentage points (β1 = -0.064, p = 0.059) and 11.0 percentage points (β1 
= -0.110, p < 0.01) lower, respectively,  for DPA firms compared with prosecuted firms. In total, 
the evidence provided in Table 7 is inconsistent with the use of DPAs mitigating unintended 
consequences of prosecution accruing to employees of the prosecuted firm. Rather, our results 
indicate that DPAs have a negative impact on employees in the years following the unlawful 
behavior relative to prosecution of the firm.  
In Table 8, we report results of our tests in which we examine the effect of DPAs on 
changes in asset levels. Relative to the control sample, the change in total assets for DPA firms is 
11.8, 16.1, and 20.9 percentage points lower by the end of the first, second, and third years 
following the DPA, respectively. We find no difference between prosecuted firms and matched 
control firms for any of the years following the event. In tests benchmarking DPA firms against 
prosecuted firms, β1 is not statistically significant. When examining the DPA source documents, 
we find that certain agreements explicitly discuss the closure of segments or branches associated 
with the corporate wrongdoing. Overall, the results in Table 8 provides modest empirical evidence 
consistent with DPA firms downsizing.  
7. Conclusion 
The recent increase in the use of DPAs as a mechanism to hold firms accountable for having 
engaged in wrongdoing and to reform its conduct has given rise to a vigorous debate regarding the 
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merits and drawbacks of such alternative disciplining arrangements. While those in favor of DPAs 
argue that the agreements provide the benefits of prosecution without the unintended consequences 
to other stakeholder groups, opponents posit that replacing prosecution with extrajudicial 
agreements diminishes the rule of law and allows for discretion in their application, which may 
favor certain firms and create an uneven playing field. Currently, anecdotal evidence supports both 
sides. Our study is one of the first to provide systematic empirical evidence on whether the claims 
in favor of this new method to deal with corporate crime are substantiated.   
We begin by descriptively documenting the nature of DPAs. To provide evidence on the 
consequences of this increasingly popular disciplining mechanism, we then document the stock 
market performance of firms subject to such agreements relative to their peers (matched controls) 
and relative to firms subject to prosecution. We find that DPA firms have lower buy-and-hold 
returns compared to a matched sample of control firms. Prosecuted firms, on the other hand, do 
not exhibit lower returns compared to a matched sample of control firms. Comparing the two 
groups of firms subject to different disciplining mechanism directly, DPA and prosecuted firms, 
we find that, on average, firms subject to DPAs perform worse in the post-period relative to the 
prosecuted sample. Such firms experience significantly lower buy-and hold-returns in the one to 
three years following the event.  
Further, we examine the claim that DPAs prevent collateral damages to innocent parties 
who are not responsible for the crimes committed by the organization. We find no evidence that 
the agreements protect firms’ stakeholders from negative consequences. In fact, our results 
document negative real consequences accruing to the stakeholders of DPA firms in the post-DPA 
period relative to control firms, as well as relative to the prosecuted firms, as measured by the 
changes in both sales levels and the number of employees.  
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Overall, our results do not lend credence to the notion that DPAs are associated with 
superior market performance or less collateral damage to other stakeholders. By documenting 
these findings, our study sheds light on the controversial debate regarding the merits of shielding 
firms from prosecution by providing early empirical evidence on this subject and may be able to 
provide insights to regulators in other countries considering introducing these or similar 
agreements to deal with corporate crime. 
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Appendix 
Variable Descriptions 
 
DPAt  An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that enter into either a non-
prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement in year t and 0 otherwise. 
 
Prosecutedt  An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that are prosecuted by the 
government in year t and 0 otherwise. 
 
BHARt+n  A firm’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return cumulated 
from the beginning of event year year t to the end of year t+n, calculated 
as e∑ ୪୬(ଵା ௥௘௧)
(౪శ౤)×ౣ
ౣసభ − e∑ ୪୬(ଵା ௩௪௥௘௧ௗ)
(౪శ౤)×ౣ
ౣసభ  where m is the month in year 
t+n and ret and vwretd are the monthly return and value-weighted market 
returns, respectively, obtained from the CRSP monthly stock file. 
 
ΔSalest+n  The percentage change in annual sales levels (sale), measured as the 
difference in sales measured in year t+n less sales in year t-1 scaled by 
sales in year t-1. 
 
ΔEmpt+n  The percentage change in employees (emp), measured as the difference 
in employees measured in year t+n less employees measured in year t-
1 scaled by employees in year t-1. 
 
ΔTAt+n  The percentage change in total assets (at), measured as the difference in 
total assets measured in year t+n less total assets measured in year t-1 
scaled by total assets in year t-1. 
 
Sizet-1  The natural log of a firm’s market value of equity (csho×prcc_f) 
measured in the year prior to the event year. 
 
MBt-1  The firm’s market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
measured in the year prior to the event year (csho×prcc_f / ceq). 
 
PPEt-1  Property, plant, and equipment (ppegt) measured in the year prior to the 
event year scaled by lagged assets (at).  
 
Sales Growtht-1  Change in sales (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒) in the year prior to the event year scaled by 
lagged sales.  
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ROA,t-1  Net income (ni) measured in the year prior to the event year scaled by 
lagged assets (at).  
 
Returnt-1  The annualized return (ret) measured in the year prior to the event year.  
 
Return Stdt-1  The standard deviation of returns (ret) measured in the year prior to the 
event year.  
 
Equity Issuet-1  The firm’s sale of common and preferred stocks (sstk) scaled by lagged 
assets (at).  
 
Going Concernt-1  Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm receives a going concern opinion 
in the year prior to the event year.  
 
Coveraget-1  A firm’s analyst coverage measured in the year prior to the event year.  
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Figure 1: Market-Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
This figure plots the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) from the beginning of the event year 
t to the end of the third year after year t for DPA firms (shown by the solid red line) and prosecuted 
firms (shown by the blue dashed line). 
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Table 1: Sample Construction 
 
This table presents the construction of the final DPA sample. 
DPAs identified through FOIA requests 467 
Less: Firms with unavailable CRSP price data 283 
Less: Firms missing full set of control variables 174 
Final sample of DPA firms 109 
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Table 2: Description of DPA Firms 
 
This table describes our sample by industry, primary offense, and agreement terms. Panel A presents the 
number of DPAs by industry. Panel B presents the number DPAs by primary offense. Panel C presents the 
number of DPAs by binary agreement terms we hand collected. Panel D presents the number of DPAs by 
continuous agreement terms. 
Panel A: By Industry       
     N 
Mining (10-14)   8 
Construction (15-17)   2 
Manufacturing (20-39)   49 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service (40-49) 7 
Wholesale Trade (50-51)    5 
Retail Trade (52-59)    2 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (60-67)    28 
Services (70-89)    6 
Other (99)    2 
Total     109 
Panel B: By Primary Offense      
     N 
Antitrust    4 
Environmental    1 
FCPA/Bribery/Kickbacks    46 
Food and Drug    9 
Fraud    44 
Labor    2 
Other    2 
Safety    1 
Total     109 
Panel C: By Agreement Terms (Binary)     
  
Independent 
Monitor 
Pre-Agreement 
Compliance 
Compliance 
Program 
Yes 37 21 23 
No 72 88 86 
Total  109 109 109 
Panel D: Agreement Terms (Continuous)     
  
Probationary 
Period (Years)  
Monetary Fine 
($millions) 
Mean 3.62  $96.16 
Min 1.00  $0 
25th Percentile 3.00  $1.10 
Median 3.00  $13.44 
75th Percentile 5.00  $50.00 
Max 7.00  $1,700.00 
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Table 3: Sample Characteristics 
 
This table presents a comparison of firm characteristics as of the most recent fiscal year-end before the DPA or prosecution. We provide results for 
separate control samples consisting of firms that do not enter into a DPA or who are not prosecuted by the government that are closest in size to the 
DPA or prosecuted firm in the same 2-digit SIC industry. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
  DPA     Prosecuted     DPA - Prosecuted   
  N Treat Control Diff  N Treat Control Diff   Diff 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)  (v)        (vi)       (vii)  (viii)   (ix) 
Sizet-1 109 9.423 9.357 0.066   496 8.711 8.541 0.170   0.712*** 
MBt-1 109 2.753 3.082 -0.329   496 3.515 4.080 -0.565*  -0.762* 
PPEt-1 109 0.180 0.244 -0.064*  496 0.269 0.312 -0.043**  -0.089*** 
Sales Growtht-1 109 0.044 0.096 -0.052*  496 0.093 0.150 -0.057***  -0.049** 
ROAt-1 109 0.037 0.044 -0.007   496 0.053 0.052 0.001   -0.016  
Returnt-1 109 0.130 0.153 -0.023   496 0.179 0.284 -0.105**  -0.049  
Return Stdt-1 109 0.101 0.089 0.012   496 0.109 0.112 -0.003   -0.008  
Equity Issuet-1 109 0.012 0.016 -0.004   496 0.021 0.031 -0.010*  -0.009  
Going Concernt-1 109 0.009 0.009 0.000   496 0.012 0.006 0.006   -0.003  
Coveraget-1 109 18.266 17.339 0.927   496 18.452 13.938 4.514***  -0.186  
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Table 4: Univariate Tests 
 
This table presents univariate tests of BHAR. Column (i) presents the mean BHAR for 109 DPA firms and 
tests whether it differs from zero. Column (ii) presents the mean BHAR for 496 prosecuted firms and tests 
whether it differs from zero. Column (iii) presents tests comparing the mean BHAR for DPA firms to the 
mean BHAR for prosecuted firms. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.   
  DPA Firms Prosecuted Firms DPA – Prosecuted Firms 
  (i) (ii) (iii) 
BHARt 0.030  -0.002  0.032  
BHARt+1 -0.106*** 0.032  -0.138** 
BHARt+2 -0.143** 0.080** -0.223*** 
BHARt+3 -0.141* 0.117*** -0.258*** 
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Table 5: BHAR 
This table presents results of our tests of H1. In columns (i) through (iv), DPA firms are benchmarked against a matched control sample. In columns (v) through 
(viii), prosecuted firms are benchmarked against a matched control sample. In columns (ix) through (xii), DPA firms are benchmarked against prosecuted firms. 
All tests are two-sided. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.   
  DPA vs. Control Firms     Prosecuted vs. Control Firms     DPA vs. Prosecuted   
  BHARt BHARt+1 BHARt+2 BHARt+3    BHARt  BHARt+1  BHARt+2  BHARt+3    BHARt  BHARt+1  BHARt+2  BHARt+3  
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)   (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)   (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) 
                                          
DPAt -0.009  -0.148* -0.144  -0.174                  0.031  -0.155*** -0.205*** -0.214** 
  ( 0.864)  ( 0.100)  ( 0.117)  ( 0.172)                  ( 0.355)  ( 0.001)  ( 0.001)  ( 0.019)  
Prosecutedt               -0.016  0.003  0.064  0.093                
                ( 0.557)  ( 0.939)  ( 0.157)  ( 0.113)                
Sizet-1 -0.029  -0.003  -0.031  -0.060    -0.013  -0.028** -0.029* -0.047**   -0.022 * -0.011  -0.028  -0.046  
  ( 0.121)  ( 0.903)  ( 0.322)  ( 0.183)    ( 0.110)  ( 0.037)  ( 0.064)  ( 0.023)    ( 0.084)  ( 0.592)  ( 0.238)  ( 0.162)  
MBt-1 0.010  -0.005  -0.016  -0.025    -0.003  -0.001  -0.007  -0.005    0.003  -0.004  -0.010  -0.011  
  ( 0.306)  ( 0.715)  ( 0.264)  ( 0.251)    ( 0.453)  ( 0.931)  ( 0.232)  ( 0.550)    ( 0.471)  ( 0.586)  ( 0.232)  ( 0.326)  
PPEt-1 0.075  -0.113  -0.284  -0.340    0.057  0.063  0.127  0.180    0.085  -0.084  -0.082  -0.074  
  ( 0.506)  ( 0.446)  ( 0.105)  ( 0.146)    ( 0.292)  ( 0.430)  ( 0.161)  ( 0.130)    ( 0.278)  ( 0.478)  ( 0.545)  ( 0.685)  
Sales Growtht-1 0.106  0.233  0.151  0.200    -0.046  -0.084  0.063  0.043    -0.049  -0.086  0.058  0.033  
  ( 0.569)  ( 0.532)  ( 0.614)  ( 0.652)    ( 0.496)  ( 0.355)  ( 0.529)  ( 0.724)    ( 0.585)  ( 0.459)  ( 0.692)  ( 0.865)  
ROAt-1 -0.254  -0.531  0.203  0.214    0.204  0.209  0.463* 0.471    0.223  0.770*** 1.158*** 1.112** 
  ( 0.482)  ( 0.509)  ( 0.754)  ( 0.818)    ( 0.301)  ( 0.399)  ( 0.055)  ( 0.140)    ( 0.468)  ( 0.006)  ( 0.001)  ( 0.030)  
Returnt-1 -0.055  -0.048  -0.041  -0.068    -0.072** -0.123*** -0.124*** -0.151***   -0.098 ** -0.120** -0.169*** -0.173* 
  ( 0.619)  ( 0.709)  ( 0.800)  ( 0.803)    ( 0.014)  ( 0.001)  ( 0.003)  ( 0.009)    ( 0.014)  ( 0.011)  ( 0.002)  ( 0.064)  
Return Stdt-1 2.740*** 1.531  0.975  0.689    0.863** 0.526  0.824  1.373*   1.292 *** 1.432** 1.875** 2.339** 
  ( 0.001)  ( 0.224)  ( 0.510)  ( 0.707)    ( 0.023)  ( 0.337)  ( 0.189)  ( 0.092)    ( 0.001)  ( 0.026)  ( 0.026)  ( 0.032)  
Equity Issuet-1 -1.718*** -1.734* -1.235  -1.212    -0.172  -0.118  -0.498* -1.135***   -0.363  -0.702** -0.904*** -1.202*** 
  ( 0.002)  ( 0.071)  ( 0.121)  ( 0.355)    ( 0.481)  ( 0.771)  ( 0.097)  (< 0.001)    ( 0.116)  ( 0.026)  ( 0.004)  ( 0.007)  
Going Concernt-1 -0.348** -0.268  -0.449  -0.825*   -0.038  -0.207  -0.215  0.029    -0.266 * -0.366  -0.421  -0.266  
  ( 0.048)  ( 0.379)  ( 0.143)  ( 0.057)    ( 0.818)  ( 0.337)  ( 0.567)  ( 0.962)    ( 0.054)  ( 0.150)  ( 0.380)  ( 0.751)  
Coveraget-1 0.004  0.006  0.010*** 0.014***   0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.000    0.003  0.001  0.001  0.003  
  ( 0.104)  ( 0.122)  ( 0.008)  ( 0.009)    ( 0.570)  ( 0.666)  ( 0.607)  ( 0.932)    ( 0.186)  ( 0.842)  ( 0.754)  ( 0.524)  
Constant 0.008  -0.145  0.007  0.321    -0.325*** -0.300* -0.034  0.009    -0.414 *** -0.482** -0.062  0.049  
  ( 0.968)  ( 0.682)  ( 0.984)  ( 0.522)    ( 0.003)  ( 0.071)  ( 0.853)  ( 0.968)    ( 0.002)  ( 0.040)  ( 0.808)  ( 0.876)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 218  218  218  218    992  992  992  992    605  605  605  605  
Adj. R2 0.150  0.002  0.005  0.012    0.082  0.075  0.034  0.042    0.162  0.102  0.069  0.050  
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Table 6: Change in Sales 
This table presents results of our tests of H2, examining the change in sales levels. In columns (i) through (iv), DPA firms are benchmarked against a matched control 
sample. In columns (v) through (viii), prosecuted firms are benchmarked against a matched control sample. In columns (ix) through (xii), DPA firms are benchmarked 
against prosecuted firms. All tests are two-sided. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Significance is denoted 
by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
  DPA vs. Control Firms     Prosecuted vs. Control Firms     DPA vs. Prosecuted   
  ΔSalest ΔSalest+1 ΔSalest+2 ΔSalest+3   ΔSalest ΔSalest+1 ΔSalest+2 ΔSalest+3   ΔSalest ΔSalest+1 ΔSalest+2 ΔSalest+3 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)   (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)   (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) 
                                           
DPAt -0.059* -0.108 ** -0.214*** -0.237***                 0.002  -0.041  -0.105** -0.112** 
  ( 0.067)  ( 0.030)  ( 0.002)  ( 0.003)                  ( 0.941)  ( 0.219)  ( 0.023)  ( 0.034)  
Prosecutedt               0.013  -0.010  -0.017  -0.025                
                ( 0.454)  ( 0.735)  ( 0.691)  ( 0.625)                
Sizet-1 -0.011  -0.023  -0.040* -0.034    0.002  -0.004  -0.011  -0.017    -0.005  -0.006  -0.025* -0.038** 
  ( 0.306)  ( 0.121)  ( 0.070)  ( 0.149)    ( 0.730)  ( 0.628)  ( 0.419)  ( 0.323)    ( 0.399)  ( 0.530)  ( 0.084)  ( 0.034)  
MBt-1 -0.008  0.000  -0.001  -0.003    0.003  0.010  0.021** 0.026 **   0.003  0.009  0.012  0.016  
  ( 0.324)  ( 0.974)  ( 0.932)  ( 0.869)    ( 0.247)  ( 0.118)  ( 0.049)  ( 0.037)    ( 0.480)  ( 0.257)  ( 0.365)  ( 0.299)  
PPEt-1 0.110  0.303 ** 0.169  0.253    0.087** 0.097  0.068  0.119    0.213*** 0.324*** 0.298** 0.266  
  ( 0.136)  ( 0.015)  ( 0.399)  ( 0.316)    ( 0.049)  ( 0.188)  ( 0.553)  ( 0.376)    ( 0.002)  ( 0.002)  ( 0.049)  ( 0.125)  
Sales Growtht-1 0.243  0.218  0.291  0.189    0.187*** 0.315 ** 0.498** 0.694 ***   0.090  0.182  0.260  0.260  
  ( 0.210)  ( 0.364)  ( 0.345)  ( 0.568)    ( 0.002)  ( 0.020)  ( 0.035)  ( 0.008)    ( 0.280)  ( 0.186)  ( 0.161)  ( 0.186)  
ROAt-1 -0.512  -0.660  -0.685  -0.323    0.064  -0.329  -0.785* -0.560    0.206  0.302  0.269  0.768*** 
  ( 0.222)  ( 0.179)  ( 0.333)  ( 0.673)    ( 0.653)  ( 0.277)  ( 0.097)  ( 0.279)    ( 0.385)  ( 0.419)  ( 0.493)  ( 0.008)  
Returnt-1 0.116** 0.130 * 0.186* 0.223*   0.057*** 0.087 ** 0.082* 0.088    0.082*** 0.048  0.054  0.018  
  ( 0.047)  ( 0.095)  ( 0.058)  ( 0.081)    ( 0.008)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.084)  ( 0.107)    ( 0.002)  ( 0.312)  ( 0.364)  ( 0.795)  
Return Stdt-1 -0.254  -0.816  -1.003  -0.547    -0.025  -0.815** ** -1.313*** -1.258 **   0.075  -0.238  -0.447  -0.428  
  ( 0.606)  ( 0.229)  ( 0.262)  ( 0.571)    ( 0.912)  ( 0.011)  ( 0.004)  ( 0.015)    ( 0.784)  ( 0.486)  ( 0.314)  ( 0.420)  
Equity Issuet-1 1.228* 0.632  1.087  1.612    0.682*** 0.628 ** 0.940** 1.564 **   1.138*** 0.614  0.406  1.831* 
  ( 0.070)  ( 0.442)  ( 0.335)  ( 0.170)    (< 0.001)  ( 0.031)  ( 0.027)  ( 0.012)    (< 0.001)  ( 0.233)  ( 0.483)  ( 0.053)  
Going Concernt-1 -0.122  -0.273  -0.670*** -0.709***   -0.059  -0.127  -0.073  -0.264    -0.127  -0.143  -0.145  -0.313  
  ( 0.470)  ( 0.125)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)    ( 0.747)  ( 0.522)  ( 0.765)  ( 0.225)    ( 0.561)  ( 0.508)  ( 0.539)  ( 0.267)  
Coveraget-1 0.000  0.002  0.004  0.005    0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000    0.001  0.003  0.006* 0.008** 
  ( 0.933)  ( 0.451)  ( 0.230)  ( 0.151)    ( 0.835)  ( 0.763)  ( 0.979)  ( 0.988)    ( 0.519)  ( 0.292)  ( 0.093)  ( 0.048)  
Constant 0.235** 0.453 ** 1.002*** 1.268***   0.001  0.298 ** 0.992*** 1.074 ***   -0.053  0.123  0.956*** 0.983*** 
  ( 0.041)  ( 0.014)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)    ( 0.987)  ( 0.043)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)    ( 0.634)  ( 0.475)  ( 0.002)  ( 0.005)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 218  218  218  218    992  992  992  992    605  605  605  605  
Adj. R2 0.156  0.122  0.114  0.131    0.191  0.127  0.136  0.169    0.232  0.140  0.156  0.176  
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Table 7: Change in Employees 
This table presents results of our tests of H2, examining the change in employee levels. In columns (i) through (iv), DPA firms are benchmarked against a matched 
control sample. In columns (v) through (viii), prosecuted firms are benchmarked against a matched control sample. In columns (ix) through (xii), DPA firms are 
benchmarked against prosecuted firms. All tests are two-sided. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Significance 
is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
  DPA vs. Control Firms     Prosecuted vs. Control Firms     DPA vs. Prosecuted   
  ΔEmpt  ΔEmpt+1  ΔEmpt+2  ΔEmpt+3    ΔEmpt  ΔEmpt+1  ΔEmpt+2  ΔEmpt+3   ΔEmpt  ΔEmpt+1  ΔEmpt+2  ΔEmpt+3  
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)    (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii)   (ix)  (x)  (xi)  (xii)  
                                         
DPAt 0.005  -0.039  -0.077* -0.108**                -0.001  -0.016  -0.064* -0.110*** 
  ( 0.832)  ( 0.291)  ( 0.073)  ( 0.025)                 ( 0.943)  ( 0.565)  ( 0.059)  ( 0.007)  
Prosecutedt               0.029* -0.026  -0.040  -0.036               
                ( 0.071)  ( 0.363)  ( 0.265)  ( 0.379)               
Sizet-1 -0.010  -0.016  -0.013  -0.020    -0.003  -0.019** -0.027** -0.029**  -0.009  -0.017* -0.028** -0.033** 
  ( 0.217)  ( 0.151)  ( 0.327)  ( 0.188)    ( 0.513)  ( 0.019)  ( 0.013)  ( 0.026)   ( 0.102)  ( 0.055)  ( 0.018)  ( 0.022)  
MBt-1 0.013** 0.018** 0.018** 0.012    0.004  0.011* 0.017** 0.022   0.006  0.011  0.018* 0.021  
  ( 0.011)  ( 0.023)  ( 0.016)  ( 0.150)    ( 0.141)  ( 0.086)  ( 0.041)  ( 0.024)   ( 0.189)  ( 0.181)  ( 0.091)  ( 0.106)  
PPEt-1 0.064  0.024  0.023  -0.049    -0.051  -0.097  -0.144* -0.125   0.026  0.089  -0.024  -0.031  
  ( 0.332)  ( 0.799)  ( 0.834)  ( 0.667)    ( 0.121)  ( 0.125)  ( 0.096)  ( 0.200)   ( 0.637)  ( 0.301)  ( 0.809)  ( 0.777)  
Sales Growtht-1 0.101  0.127  0.260* 0.298*   0.152*** 0.336*** 0.537*** 0.633***  0.185*** 0.323*** 0.436*** 0.439*** 
  ( 0.269)  ( 0.261)  ( 0.073)  ( 0.084)    0.000  ( 0.002)  ( 0.001)  ( 0.001)   ( 0.006)  ( 0.002)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)  
ROAt-1 0.280  0.491** 0.546** 0.814**   0.097  -0.100  -0.100  0.342   -0.054  0.005  0.145  0.885*** 
  ( 0.122)  ( 0.029)  ( 0.045)  ( 0.017)    ( 0.412)  ( 0.722)  ( 0.786)  ( 0.352)   ( 0.783)  ( 0.989)  ( 0.682)  (< 0.001)  
Returnt-1 0.039  0.131* 0.121  0.143*   0.086*** 0.101*** 0.081** 0.081*  0.074** 0.081* 0.062  0.042  
  ( 0.407)  ( 0.075)  ( 0.121)  ( 0.090)    ( 0.001)  ( 0.002)  ( 0.025)  ( 0.065)   ( 0.015)  ( 0.088)  ( 0.203)  ( 0.485)  
Return Stdt-1 0.364  0.258  0.092  0.095    -0.140  -0.657*** -0.851*** -0.664*  -0.195  -0.267  -0.368  -0.097  
  ( 0.272)  ( 0.525)  ( 0.849)  ( 0.863)    ( 0.321)  ( 0.007)  ( 0.009)  ( 0.087)   ( 0.228)  ( 0.304)  ( 0.227)  ( 0.797)  
Equity Issuet-1 -0.243  -0.640  -0.218  -0.035    0.358** 0.361  0.434  0.705**  0.495** 0.308  0.193  0.707  
  ( 0.429)  ( 0.106)  ( 0.605)  ( 0.943)    ( 0.014)  ( 0.114)  ( 0.170)  ( 0.087)   ( 0.049)  ( 0.301)  ( 0.618)  ( 0.192)  
Going Concernt-1 -0.284*** -0.382*** -0.602*** -0.659***   -0.129* -0.024  -0.088  -0.310*  -0.190*** -0.098  -0.108  -0.295* 
  (< 0.001)  ( 0.002)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)    ( 0.083)  ( 0.863)  ( 0.592)  ( 0.050)   ( 0.009)  ( 0.433)  ( 0.483)  ( 0.084)  
Coveraget-1 0.000  0.003  0.003  0.003    0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.003  0.003  0.004  
  ( 0.959)  ( 0.169)  ( 0.202)  ( 0.144)    ( 0.712)  ( 0.658)  ( 0.974)  ( 0.948)   ( 0.813)  ( 0.187)  ( 0.257)  ( 0.166)  
Constant 0.039  0.117  0.197  0.262    0.100  0.432*** 0.708*** 0.723***  0.217** 0.224  0.468  0.505** 
  ( 0.618)  ( 0.343)  ( 0.164)  ( 0.113)    ( 0.169)  ( 0.002)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)   ( 0.045)  ( 0.119)  ( 0.011)  ( 0.020)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 218  218  218  218    992  992  992  992   605  605  605  605  
Adj. R2 0.118  0.156  0.161  0.179    0.204  0.150  0.147  0.172   0.200  0.171  0.149  0.198  
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Table 8: Change in Assets 
This table presents results of our tests H2, examining the change in total asset levels. In columns (i) through (iv), DPA firms are benchmarked against a matched 
control sample. In columns (v) through (viii), prosecuted firms are benchmarked against a matched control sample. In columns (ix) through (xii), DPA firms are 
benchmarked against prosecuted firms. All tests are two-sided. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Significance 
is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
  DPA vs. Control Firms     Prosecuted vs. Control Firms     DPA vs. Prosecuted   
  ΔTAt ΔTAt+1 ΔTAt+2 ΔTAt+3   ΔTAt ΔTAt+1 ΔTAt+2 ΔTAt+3   ΔTAt ΔTAt+1 ΔTAt+2 ΔTAt+3 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)    (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii)    (ix)  (x)  (xi)  (xii)  
                                                      
DPAt -0.003  -0.118** -0.161** -0.209**                 0.022  -0.036  -0.043  -0.068  
  ( 0.941)  ( 0.047)  ( 0.021)  ( 0.013)                  ( 0.536)  ( 0.360)  ( 0.309)  ( 0.201)  
Prosecutedt               0.060*** -0.003  -0.035  -0.062                
                ( 0.009)  ( 0.930)  ( 0.431)  ( 0.284)                
Sizet-1 -0.013  -0.035* -0.036  -0.056**   -0.002  -0.010  -0.021  -0.038**   -0.010  -0.015  -0.035*** -0.058*** 
  ( 0.267)  ( 0.066)  ( 0.111)  ( 0.035)    ( 0.747)  ( 0.333)  ( 0.148)  ( 0.041)    ( 0.257)  ( 0.254)  ( 0.042)  ( 0.009)  
MBt-1 0.019** 0.030** 0.030** 0.026*   0.011** 0.018** 0.023** 0.033**   0.011  0.018* 0.018  0.019  
  ( 0.028)  ( 0.023)  ( 0.025)  ( 0.082)    ( 0.012)  ( 0.024)  ( 0.037)  ( 0.016)    ( 0.129)  ( 0.074)  ( 0.147)  ( 0.226)  
PPEt-1 0.165  0.131  0.121  0.094    0.000  -0.063  -0.090  -0.029    0.105  0.020  -0.100  -0.064  
  ( 0.137)  ( 0.372)  ( 0.474)  ( 0.636)    ( 0.995)  ( 0.382)  ( 0.336)  ( 0.803)    ( 0.241)  ( 0.856)  ( 0.454)  ( 0.685)  
Sales Growtht-1 0.122  0.104  0.239  0.152    0.107  0.235** 0.351** 0.533***   0.171* 0.335*** 0.415*** 0.380** 
  ( 0.405)  ( 0.542)  ( 0.336)  ( 0.561)    ( 0.111)  ( 0.049)  ( 0.011)  ( 0.001)    ( 0.093)  ( 0.007)  ( 0.003)  ( 0.023)  
ROAt-1 0.509* 0.701* 0.799  1.449***   0.251  0.134  0.498  0.833**   0.395  0.631** 1.209*** 1.778*** 
  ( 0.070)  ( 0.070)  ( 0.106)  ( 0.007)    ( 0.214)  ( 0.654)  ( 0.147)  ( 0.050)    ( 0.267)  ( 0.037)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)  
Returnt-1 0.099  0.202* 0.136  0.179    0.130*** 0.160*** 0.105* 0.106    0.091** 0.134*** 0.086  0.057  
  ( 0.170)  ( 0.063)  ( 0.195)  ( 0.144)    ( 0.003)  (< 0.001)  ( 0.050)  ( 0.116)    ( 0.020)  ( 0.003)  ( 0.136)  ( 0.429)  
Return Stdt-1 0.658  1.206* 1.025  0.936    0.022  -0.387  -0.704* -0.485    -0.110  -0.093  -0.467  -0.208  
  ( 0.234)  ( 0.091)  ( 0.197)  ( 0.273)    ( 0.926)  ( 0.219)  ( 0.057)  ( 0.348)    ( 0.718)  ( 0.780)  ( 0.201)  ( 0.717)  
Equity Issuet-1 -0.655  -1.365** -0.800  -1.132    0.358  0.386  0.767  1.140*   0.943*** 0.024  0.265  0.400  
  ( 0.205)  ( 0.024)  ( 0.287)  ( 0.124)    ( 0.100)  ( 0.345)  ( 0.149)  ( 0.085)    ( 0.002)  ( 0.935)  ( 0.587)  ( 0.508)  
Going Concernt-1 -0.435*** -0.725*** -0.866*** -0.961***   -0.129  -0.173  -0.352* -0.475*   0.073  0.070  -0.049  -0.120  
  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)    ( 0.536)  ( 0.412)  ( 0.085)  ( 0.081)    ( 0.762)  ( 0.742)  ( 0.817)  ( 0.725)  
Coveraget-1 0.001  0.003  0.005* 0.008**    -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.004    0.001  0.002  0.006* 0.011*** 
  ( 0.593)  ( 0.185)  ( 0.051)  ( 0.012)    ( 0.228)  ( 0.890)  ( 0.665)  ( 0.216)    ( 0.758)  ( 0.384)  ( 0.070)  ( 0.007)  
Constant 0.091  0.493** 0.647** 0.990***   0.164* 0.521*** 0.858*** 1.189***   0.256* 0.478*** 0.903*** 1.255*** 
  ( 0.377)  ( 0.025)  ( 0.010)  ( 0.002)    ( 0.081)  ( 0.001)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)    ( 0.091)  ( 0.008)  (< 0.001)  (< 0.001)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 218  218  218  218    992  992  992  992    605  605  605  605  
Adj. R2 0.098  0.134  0.144  0.164    0.177  0.141  0.128  0.161    0.158  0.173  0.194  0.191  
 
